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INTRODUCTION
Over the last 20-30 years there have been numerous crises
which have affected the entire financial intermediary system
and/or individual financial institutions. The reasons behind
these crises have been varied: some were brought about by
macroeconomic, or structural/institutional factors (e.g.
inadequate regulation during financial liberalisation), whilst
others can be traced back to microeconomic causes (e.g.
excessive growth, inefficient risk management methods).
The basic underlying reasons for the crises potentially
emerging in modern banking systems are the inefficient and
imperfect functioning of financial markets and the
asymmetrical information emerging in markets. Financial
crises can be triggered by external shocks as well. The fact
that a significant number of cross-border banking groups
have come into being throughout Europe may also increase
the probability of a crisis situation. A crisis can affect a
particular country, but through the ownership and funding
channel, the crisis can easily spread to the financial
intermediary system of other countries as well. Furthermore,
the occurrence of crises can be facilitated by the recent
strengthening in the integration of financial markets and the
appearance of increasingly complex financial products, as
risk management cannot always keep pace with the
complexity of the products.
Although the probability of the emergence of crises is lower
in a balanced economic environment, the negative effect of
such crises may be more serious as a result of markets and
products becoming more complex. In the event of a general
lack of confidence in the money market and/or if the crisis at
the credit institution(s) concerned jeopardises the stability of
the financial intermediary system,
1 aggregate liquidity
increasing measures by central banks and emergency liquidity
assistance to individual banks on the basis of the ‘lender of
last resort’ function may become necessary,
2 in order to
restore confidence and support financial stability.
The importance of central banks’ role in crisis management
and solving liquidity problems is highlighted by the fact that
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The fundamental task and responsibility of central banks is to maintain and promote the stability of the financial system. In
order to achieve this, central banks strive to prevent crises using all the instruments at their disposal. If a crisis occurs, central
banks play a significant role in efficient crisis management and the crisis resolution process. In spite of the crisis prevention
activity of the authorities – including central banks – crisis events can not be avoided.
The crises potentially emerging in modern banking systems are basically the consequence of the imperfect functioning of
financial markets. In addition, external shocks can trigger crises as well. In order to support the stability of the financial
intermediary system and to help restore market confidence, there may be a need for central banks to carry out aggregate
liquidity increasing measures which affect the market as a whole and for emergency liquidity assistance based on individual
consideration, in line with the ‘lender of last resort’ function. Continuous development of crisis management work and the
related instruments is needed in order to ensure quick and efficient central bank decisions. One of the most important elements
of crisis management is the organisation of crisis simulation exercises.
Within the European Union, special emphasis has been placed on the development of a crisis management framework aimed at
promoting more efficient co-operation between the competent authorities, since a significant number of cross-border banking
groups have been formed throughout Europe recently. A potential crisis in a parent bank’s country affecting a larger banking
group may jeopardise the stability of the financial intermediary system in the countries of subsidiary banks as well, through the
interrelationships within the group. This article outlines the significant assistance that these exercises can provide for central
bank decisions and for the development of co-operation between authorities.
1 A crisis jeopardises the stability of the financial intermediary system if it triggers a significant negative effect among credit institutions, at financial markets, in the
financial infrastructure or in the real economy.
2‘According to the Magyar Nemzeti Bank Act, in the event that circumstances arise which jeopardise the stability of the financial system due to the operation of a credit
institution, the MNB may extend an emergency loan to the credit institution, observing the prohibitions on monetary financing.the crisis on the US sub-prime mortgage market also affected
the European money and capital market. As a result, in
addition to central bank measures which increased aggregate
liquidity and affected the market as a whole (e.g. European
Central Bank, Bank of England), central bank intervention
for individual bank also became necessary (e.g. emergency
liquidity assistance by the Bank of England to the Northern
Rock credit institution).
On the one hand, this article explores central banks’ role in
crisis management, and on the other hand it shows how crisis
simulation exercises facilitate and strengthen the efficient
resolution of liquidity problems and crisis situations. In
addition to describing the general objectives, successes and
lessons drawn from simulation exercises, this article also
discusses the MNB’s prominent role in developing and
organising such exercises.
CENTRAL BANKS’ROLE IN CRISIS
MANAGEMENT
In recent years, financial markets have become strongly
integrated, and increasingly complicated, complex financial
products have come to existence. Furthermore, with the
creation of banking groups pursuing cross-border activities,
increased attention has been paid to risk and crisis
management work.
Complex financial products facilitate a more flexible, efficient
distribution of risks among the participants of the money and
capital market, but they also contribute to the more rapid
spread of emerging new risks. Regarding the risks at banking
groups, subsidiaries significantly rely on the parent bank’s
financial resources in general, and as a consequence a shock
affecting the parent bank may cause serious financial problems
at the subsidiaries as well. On the other hand, a crisis at a major
subsidiary can also have a negative influence on the parent bank
through the contagion channel within the group.
As a consequence, the development of risk management tools
as well as the preparation of stress tests and ‘emergency
scenarios’ for solving unexpected situations has gained
special importance, both for market participants and
individual authorities.
In terms of risks, a wide range of changes have taken place
recently in the evolution and management of liquidity risks.
For participants in the financial intermediary system,
including credit institutions, it is primarily the responsibility
of the institution’s management to take steps to provide for
the liquidity required for operations, and to continuously
develop the techniques and instruments employed to reduce
and manage liquidity risks. It is important to emphasise that
in the event of a crisis or liquidity problems,
3 the primary task
and responsibility of the management and the owners (parent
bank) of the credit institution is to take the measures
necessary for solving the liquidity problem. This can include
a wide range of measures, e.g. additional source of funding
from the owner or another member in the banking group,
using central bank standing facilities, borrowing with
collateral on the money market, etc.
In addition to the authorities (such as central banks,
supervisory authorities and ministries of finance), which are
responsible for supporting the stability of the financial
intermediary system, it is a primary task of central banks to
prevent crises. Supervisory authorities and ministries of finance
contribute to the achievement of this target through their
prudential supervisory activities, focusing on risks and the
formulation of regulations which facilitate the efficient
operation of money and capital markets, respectively. Central
banks, in turn, using various macroeconomic scenarios analyse
the resilience of the financial intermediary system to
macroeconomic shocks, and, using stress tests, examine market
participants’ vulnerability to various risks. In addition, central
banks inform the participants in the financial intermediary
system about current issues regarding financial stability in their
various publications, in order to increase the risk awareness of
those concerned. In the event of a crisis, however, the
authorities are responsible for ensuring efficient management,
i.e. solving the problems within the shortest period of time
possible and at the lowest cost for society.
Central banks usually play a prominent role in solving crises
emerging on the money market, at credit institutions and in
the financial infrastructure, since the first signs of a crisis
usually appear as significant liquidity troubles. By monitoring
developments in money markets and developments of
problems in payment and clearing transactions, non-payments
and ‘queuing’ it is possible to draw conclusions regarding the
seriousness of the potential danger of contagion. In other
words, this makes it possible to determine whether a liquidity
problem is unique or the troubles emerging in the interbank
market may generate a general liquidity shortage, and whether
the liquidity problem of the credit institution concerned can
result in serious troubles in the payment transactions of other
credit institution(s), due to non-payment.
In the event of a general confidence crisis in the money market
and liquidity problems affecting the market as a whole, the
central bank can apply – in addition to the normative
monetary policy instruments – general liquidity increasing
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3 Liquidity trouble: short-term payment problem. A credit institution is illiquid if it does not have sufficient funds to be able to meet its obligations over the short run.measures which help the whole market. If the crisis appears as
an individual credit institution problem, it is important to
emphasise the absolute priority of crisis solution within the
private sector. This means that if the credit institution turns to
the central bank for emergency liquidity assistance, the central
bank primarily insists that the crisis be solved by the owners
and the creditors. Beyond this, it can undertake an active
mediatory role in the organisation of a solution within the
private sector, e.g. in the organisation of a syndicate providing
the additional liquidity.
4 In the event of an incident in the
financial infrastructure, the central bank can also extend the
working hours of the settlement system.
The emergency liquidity assistance which the central bank can
grant is really the last of the central bank’s crisis solution
instruments. It is the central bank’s discretional right and
depends solely on its assessment and decision whether to grant
such credit, and if so, on what conditions, in order to maintain
and support the stability of the financial intermediary system
and to restore the confidence of the money market.
Of course, crisis management and solving liquidity and
solvency problems
5 require close co-operation between the
responsible authorities and efficient co-ordination of the
necessary measures, including market solutions as well. In
order to maximise the efficiency of crisis management, the
authorities also formulate internal rules of procedure to be
applied in the event of a crisis. As central banks, supervisory
authorities and ministries of finance have different
instruments at their disposal in a crisis situation and they can
take different measures at the various stages of a crisis: thus,
it is very important to ensure the flow of information
between the authorities and to clearly delineate the scope of
duties, responsibilities and decision-making powers. Laying
new foundations for co-operation between authorities and
creating a framework for crisis management have gained
special importance recently, both at the national level and
between the authorities of individual countries.
CREATING A CRISIS MANAGEMENT
FRAMEWORK WITHIN THE EUROPEAN
UNION
Recently, a significant number of banking groups pursuing
cross-border banking activities have been formed in Europe.
A potential crisis in a parent bank’s country affecting a larger
banking group may also jeopardise financial stability in
countries where subsidiary banks are located, through the
interrelationships within the group. In addition, a broader
crisis may significantly weaken the efficiency of the central
bank’s monetary policy measures as well.
Despite the increasing activity of cross-border banking
groups, the supervisory structure and central banks’
emergency liquidity assistance activities have remained at the
national level. Furthermore, the practices in the regulations
governing the financial intermediary system differ somewhat
from country to country, despite the steps towards legal
harmonisation within the EU. In order to eliminate the
resulting problems, within the EU greater emphasis is being
placed on co-operation between authorities and the creation
of frameworks which facilitate more efficient crisis
management. This purpose is served by the provisions
regarding crisis management of the EU directives,
6 as well as
national-level, bilateral, regional and EU-level voluntary
agreements – in the form of Memoranda of Understanding –
between the authorities of individual countries to be applied
in the event of a crisis, and also by simulation exercises which
test these co-operation frameworks.
Voluntary agreements which set out procedures for co-
operation between authorities constitute a prominent
element of the crisis management framework. As the tasks
and interests of individual authorities are different,
conflicting interests may emerge during crisis management.
Therefore, it is important that the authorities determine the
scope of duties, responsibilities and decision-making powers
in the form of preliminary agreements, define the processes
for the flow of information, and clarify issues which require
co-operation between authorities.
Within the European Union, two Memoranda of
Understanding have been adopted which determine the basic
principles and establish a practical co-operation framework
for cross-border crisis management.
7 An example of regional
co-operation is the agreement between the central banks of
some North European countries (Denmark, Finland, Ireland,
Norway and Sweden), aimed at strengthening co-operation
in the event of a crisis. As for bilateral co-operation, e.g. the
Dutch and Belgian authorities have concluded an agreement
to increase the efficiency of their supervisory and crisis
management activities.
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4 In the USA, the Fed coordinated among the market participants during the LTCM crisis.
5 Solvency problem: if the regulatory capital of the credit institution declines below the level required by the relevant provisions of law. A credit institution is insolvent,
if it is unable to meet the claims outstanding vis-à-vis it, as the market value of its assets does not reach the value of its obligations.
6The CRD (Capital Requirements Directive: 2006/48/EC, 2006/49/EC) and the FCD (Financial Conglomerates Directive: 2002/87/EC) also contain provisions regarding
crisis management and co-operation between the authorities of the countries of the parent bank and subsidiary banks.
7 Memorandum of Understanding on high-level principles of co-operation between the banking supervisors and central banks of the European Union in crisis
management situations (2003). Memorandum of Understanding on co-operation between the Banking Supervisors, Central Banks and Finance Ministries of the
European Union in Financial Crisis Situations (2005).A crisis at a banking group pursuing cross-border activities
and the management of such a crisis raises a number of
questions, both for the authorities which supervise the parent
bank and for those responsible for supervision of the
subsidiaries (branches). Due to the high level of foreign
ownership, this is an important aspect for Central East
European (CEE) countries, including Hungary as well. In the
region’s banking sector, except for Slovenia, the ratio of
foreign ownership ranges between 59% and 83%. In the
Central East European region, several large banking groups
operate with parent banks which have their respective seats
within the EU and significant subsidiaries in at least two CEE
countries.
Most probably, a potential credit institution crisis in a
regional banking group will not remain an isolated problem
within a single country, as the crisis may have a negative
impact on the financial intermediary systems of several
countries and on the real economy as well, due to the
ownership and financing channels. In the event of a crisis,
solving the problem and taking the necessary measures is
primarily the responsibility of the owners (the parent banks).
If the owners are not able or willing to provide for the
measures required for averting the crisis, and according to
the authorities’ assessment the crisis may jeopardise the
stability of the financial system, the efficient management of
the crisis may require intervention by the authorities and co-
operation.
In the event of a crisis at a cross-border banking group, the
EU-level crisis management framework lays out certain basic
principles for the co-operation between the authorities of the
countries of the parent bank and the subsidiary/branch.
Accordingly, the main responsibility of the authority of the
parent bank country, i.e. the authority performing
consolidated supervision, is the co-ordination of crisis
management and decision-making, as well as supplying
individual authorities with adequate information, and also, if
necessary, involving the relevant countries affected by the
crisis in the process of crisis management. In the event of a
liquidity crisis, the central bank of the parent bank country,
while in case of a solvency problem the ministry of finance,
may also become active players in co-ordinating the crisis
solution.
In addition to the primary responsibility of the national
authorities responsible for the parent bank, the authorities of
the country where the subsidiaries/branches have their seats
also have to prepare for taking the necessary measures, if they
are of the opinion that the crisis jeopardises the financial
stability of the given country. This preparation is facilitated
by the simulation exercises.
GOALS AND TYPES OF CRISIS
SIMULATION EXERCISES
Creation of the aforementioned agreements which set out
procedures for co-operation between authorities is an
important step towards more efficient crisis management.
However, when there is no crisis situation, the most efficient
and practically only tool to test the operation of the
framework is to carry out financial crisis simulation exercises.
The basic goal of such exercises is to test in the period
preceding a crisis those areas affecting co-operation, based on
which individual organisations’ demand for information, the
scope of duties, responsibilities and decision-making powers
as well as the issues which require co-ordination between
individual authorities can be defined. A preliminary
clarification of all this greatly contributes to more efficient,
faster decision-making, i.e. to crisis resolution resulting in the
lowest cost for society.
Accordingly, the goal of the exercises is to maximise the
efficient management of a potential crisis, and to facilitate the
preliminary formulation of rules of procedure, information
channels, decision-making mechanisms and communications
tactics, which allow the restoration of confidence in the
financial intermediary system and the strengthening of
financial stability.
Central banks usually play a prominent role in the
organisation of simulation exercises. This also stems from the
fact that it is central banks which encounter the first signs of
a crisis, through troubles emerging in the money market and
the problems arising in payment and settlement transactions.
In addition, on the basis of taking account of the
circumstances and the negative effect of the crisis, the central
bank can provide temporary liquidity assistance until further
steps, if any, are taken by the supervisory authority or the
ministry of finance. The central bank must make such
decisions in a short time and very often in an ambiguous
solvency situation. Moreover, it is also a very complex task to
decide to what extent the crisis jeopardises the stability of the
financial intermediary system. Simulation exercises provide
valuable assistance for considering and answering all these
questions and for identifying decision points and alternatives.
There are several types of exercises, depending on the area of
crisis management which the authorities intend to test.
• Exercises  within the central bank can concentrate on
testing central bank steps to be taken in the event of a crisis,
the process of emergency liquidity assistance and the
communication necessary in a crisis. If the given country is
an important financial centre, the central bank
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emerging in the payment and settlement system and in the
money market in a special exercise for each case. In other
central banks’ practices, these latter issues are embedded
among the other goals intended to be tested.
• At the national level, the basic objective of exercises carried
out with the involvement of the central bank, the
supervisory authority and the ministry of finance is to test
the co-operation, flow of information and decision-making
mechanisms between authorities as well as to strengthen all
these by exploring any deficiencies which are identified.
• A regional exercise – held for example by Scandinavian
countries – tests co-operation in the event of a crisis of
banking group members present in the member countries.
• At the European Union level, the first simulation exercise
was held in 2003, with the involvement of the
representatives of the central banks and supervisory
authorities of all member countries. Ministries of finance
were also represented in the second exercise held in 2006.
The objective of the EU-level simulation exercises was to
evaluate the flow of information, co-ordination and
decision-making mechanisms between authorities, the
systemic implications of the crisis, sharing of costs, if any,
as well as to test the efficiency of the voluntary agreements
concluded, in the event of a cross-border crisis.
•  During the two simulation exercises (management of a
complex financial crisis) held by the central banks
belonging to the Eurosystem, the Eurosystem’s crisis
management activity and ways to harmonise the common
monetary policy decision-making with the emergency
liquidity assistance belonging to the decision-making
powers of national central banks was tested.
CRITERIA FOR THE SUCCESS OF
SIMULATION EXERCISES
Organisation and performance of such simulation exercises
poses significant challenges for both the experts who prepare
the exercise and the participating decision-makers.
On the one hand, the success of an exercise depends on the
design of the crisis scenario. The majority of exercises
comprise fictive countries, credit institutions, financial
markets and payment systems. It is a trend that scenarios
strive to be increasingly realistic. Experts who prepare the
exercises need to carefully consider what factors may trigger
a crisis at the national, regional and EU levels and what so-
called channels of contagion may be relevant. Stress tests may
help in highlighting the vulnerable points. In national-level
simulations, actual banking data modified in accordance with
the goal of the exercise are often used.
Depending on the objective, crisis scenarios can vary widely. A
crisis can be triggered, for example, by fraud at a credit
institution, the bankruptcy of an important client that has
representations in several countries, which results in
considerable losses for the bank(s), and sudden, unfavourable
money market developments as well. Furthermore, as a
consequence of interrelationships within the group, a crisis
within a banking group may start both from the parent bank or
any of the subsidiaries. For example, a sudden reputation loss
at a member of the group and the resulting external financing
problems can easily spread to the other group members as well.
In more complex scenarios, in addition to crises at credit
institutions, negative impacts appearing in the infrastructure
and in real economy also play a prominent role.
A scenario is good, if it poses the greatest challenges possible
for the decision-makers, i.e. for example, if the crisis evolves
quickly, an unforeseeable contagion effect develops, the
systemic implication of the crisis is very complex and difficult
to assess in advance, and if the solution of the crisis may have
various outcomes. A further difficulty for decision-makers is
if it is not clear whether the bank(s) concerned has (have) a
liquidity or a solvency problem. (Although it should be noted
that in the event of a crisis, in most cases it is the solvency
situation of the bank affected by the crisis which is
questionable.) The challenge is increased, if decision-makers
must make their decisions on the basis of imperfect and
insufficient information, as well as under significant time
pressure and pressure from the media.
In the course of the exercise, decision-makers continuously
receive news and updated information on the developments
in the crisis. Those preparing the exercise have to consider
decision-makers’ potential reactions, and corresponding
outcomes have to be planned. The general practice of
preparing a simulation is that the expert staff prepare all
theoretically necessary information and materials for the
preparation of the decision, and hand them over at the
decision-makers’ request. (This also includes the case when
the experts want to present insufficient information
deliberately.)
On the other hand, the success of an exercise depends on the
reactions of the decision-makers. It is essential that those
high-level executives of authorities participate in the exercise
who actually make the necessary decisions during a crisis. It
is also necessary that they enter fully into the spirit of the
exercise, and behave as in a real crisis. To a great extent,
success depends on whether the decisions made under
significant time pressure are indeed realistic.
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the simulation, spokespersons for the authorities may also
participate in the exercise when testing external
communication, and other players as well, who for example
represent the bank in trouble, journalists or foreign
authorities.
LESSONS AND FINDINGS OF
SIMULATION EXERCISES
A simulation exercise is successful and fulfils its objective if it
provides a lesson and highlights the weaknesses, deficiencies
and potential conflicts in the co-operation of authorities.
Furthermore, if based on the above, the decision-makers
specify tasks to remedy the deficiencies and if the problems
that arise are resolved.
In the simulation exercises at various levels, numerous
problems and deficiencies with many different aspects have
cropped up, and identification and/or solution of these
problems and shortcomings has significantly contributed to
improving co-operation between authorities. The main issues
can be summarised as follows:
• In the event of a crisis, in order to provide the necessary
information for decision-making and to reduce the data
supply burdens of the bank affected by the crisis, the
authorities (central banks and supervisory authorities)
harmonised the scope of extraordinary data supply. The
authorities also harmonised who contacts foreign
authorities and the parent bank, if such measures become
necessary. Based on the exercises, the scope of all relevant
pieces of information – available only at one of the
authorities – was identified, the provision of which is
absolutely indispensable for the other institution’s
decision-making. Timely information flow with adequate
contents and efficient communication between the
authorities is absolutely necessary for rapid decision-
making which involves the smallest possible burden for
society.
•  It can be considered as a significant result that the co-
operation agreements to be applied in a crisis were refined
upon on the basis of the experience of simulation exercises,
and in several cases the agreements were formulated after
the exercise. The exercises contributed significantly to the
refinement of the scope of duties and responsibilities to be
discharged by central banks, supervisory authorities and
ministries of finance as well as of the areas which require
co-ordination, even if the fundamental principles of co-
operation were previously included in the framework of an
agreement.
•  The experiences gained in simulation exercises called
attention to the necessity to formulate systemic assessment
criteria, i.e. to elaborate the factors based upon which the
systemic implication of a crisis can be evaluated. As a result,
a common framework for systemic assessment was
formulated at the EU level, the adoption of which by
member countries allows the comparability of evaluations
prepared on the basis of the common methodology. The
exercises also showed how important it is that authorities
discuss – and if possible, harmonise – their assessment
regarding the systemic implication of a crisis, and inform one
another about the measures planned and the impacts thereof.
Harmonising these issues is extremely important for efficient
crisis management, both between the national authorities of
a country affected by a crisis and between the authorities of
individual countries in the event of a cross-border crisis.
• Basic principles to provide guidance for the authorities of
the EU member countries for the management of cross-
border crises with systemic implications were formulated
on the basis of exercises simulating banking group crisis
management. These exercises also allowed the
identification of all potential problems stemming from the
differences in regulations and practices between countries,
the elimination of which is indispensable for efficient crisis
management. Simulations facilitated the consideration of
various crisis solution possibilities as well as the
development and refinement of the relevant instruments
and techniques and also clarification of the areas where
costs can be shared between individual authorities.
•  Exercises highlighted that in the event of a crisis the
formulation of adequate external communication and its
harmonisation between authorities is extremely important
for the restoration and strengthening of market confidence.
Based on all of the above, individual authorities formulated
the external communication strategies to be applied in the
event of a crisis.
• In the course of the exercises it was demonstrated that it is
necessary to formulate the basic principles determining the
measures of authorities and relating to crisis management
in advance, but it is very important to apply the available
instruments in a flexible manner, depending on the
developments in the crisis. As a result of the simulations,
internal procedures and regulations became more concrete
and practice-oriented, and the relevant contact persons for
crisis situations were also specified at the specific
authorities.
•  In the course of the exercises and their evaluation,
decision-makers at the various authorities discussed the
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emerged, and thus became more aware of one another’s
reactions and ways of thinking, which may greatly facilitate
crisis management during a real crisis.
•  Based on the experiences of the exercises they also
determined all of the future tasks both at national and EU
levels, the fulfilment of which is necessary for the
development of crisis management. In various committees
of the EU, work is in progress in order to make the co-
operation between competent authorities more efficient,
and to enable EU-level co-operation agreements and the
crisis management framework to keep pace with the
development of financial markets.
There are a number of new ideas and opportunities for
progress arising in connection with the organisation of future
exercises and the formulation of scenarios. Making
simulations more realistic is the aim of those ideas, for
example, which suggest that the exercise should be
unexpected, decision-makers should not be aware of the date
of the exercise in order to make them experience the
outbreak of the crisis as a real stress situation, and also e.g.
that the person to be notified in the event of a crisis should
not be available. Testing of market solutions would also be
facilitated by involving real market participants in the
exercises.
THE PARTICIPATION AND ROLE OF THE
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK IN CRISIS
SIMULATION EXERCISES
Under the direction of the MNB, the Hungarian authorities
organised the first simulation exercise with the involvement
of the central bank and the supervisory authority in 2005. It
can be considered as progress in co-operation that in the
exercise held in the first quarter of 2007 the Ministry of
Finance was also an active participant. In the exercises, in
addition to testing the sharing of information and co-
operation between authorities in the event of a crisis, special
emphasis was laid on external communication and, in the
second simulation, on testing crisis solution possibilities with
the involvement of the MoF. Senior executives of the
organisations described the exercises as successful and useful,
as they contributed significantly to the improvement of the
efficiency of co-operation.
One of the important results of the exercise was that, also
taking account of the experiences gained from the
simulation, in 2006 the MNB and the Hungarian Financial
Supervisory Authority (HFSA) signed an agreement on the
principles and framework of co-operation in crisis situations,
in order to increase the efficiency of their co-operation.
Following the simulation held with the participation of the
MoF in 2007, in accordance with the practice in the EU, the
agreement is completed with the undertaking of a role by the
Ministry of Finance in crisis solutions.
In addition to national-level exercises, the MNB’s
representative participates in EU-level simulation exercises as
well. In the exercise held in 2003, the MNB’s representative,
as one from a future member country, participated only as an
observer, while in the second exercise held in 2006 the
MNB’s representative was an active participant, together
with the representatives of the HFSA and the MoF.
In terms of the simulation exercises formulated with the
MNB’s co-ordination, the Hungarian authorities play a
leading role among newly joined countries. At regional and
EU-level conferences and special expert meetings the MNB
shares its experience relating to the challenges and lessons of
crisis simulation exercises as well as the future tasks stemming
from the exercises. Within the framework of co-operation
with central banks of the region, during expert visits it also
provides information about the methodology of formulating
and organising the exercises.
In accordance with international practice and in order to
increase the efficiency of domestic-level crisis management
work, the MNB intends to organise regular simulation
exercises in the future as well, focusing on various areas. In
addition, in the future the MNB intends to test co-operation
between domestic and foreign authorities in a crisis situation,
and also urges regional-level simulation exercises. 
Moreover, in order to develop the crisis management
framework, the MNB – together with the supervisory
authority – plans to conclude bilateral co-operation
agreements to be applied in crises situations with the
authorities of countries responsible for parent banks which
have systemically relevant subsidiaries in Hungary.
CONCLUSIONS
Recently, developments in the international money market,
the impact of the US sub-prime mortgage market crisis on the
European money market and the mitigation of its negative
impact on the markets have been factors which have required
very quick reactions from central banks. All of these events
call the attention to the necessity of the continuous
development and fine-tuning of the central bank crisis
management framework and instruments.
A prominent element of this crisis management framework is
the performance of crisis simulation exercises, which is
practically the only instrument to test crisis solution before
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exercises, and it is obvious that all crisis and decision
situations and crisis solutions cannot be tested in the course
of the simulations. However, the deficiencies and problems
which emerge during the exercises, the identification of
potential conflicts of interest between authorities and the
solutions thereof contribute to the improvement of the co-
operation between authorities and to quick solutions, which
result in the lowest possible costs for the society both at the
national level and when managing cross-border crises.
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